Homomorphic Encryption {#Sec1}
======================

"Cloud computing" appears to be a hot topic in information technology; in a nutshell, this is the ability of small and computationally weak devices to delegate hard resource-intensive computations to third party (and therefore untrusted) computers. To ensure the privacy of the data, the untrusted computer should receive data in an encrypted form but still being able to process it. It means that encryption should preserve algebraic structural properties of the data. This is one of the reasons for popularity of the idea of *homomorphic encryption* \[[@CR1], [@CR2], [@CR10], [@CR11], [@CR13], [@CR14], [@CR18], [@CR19], [@CR21]--[@CR23]\] which we describe here with some simplifications aimed at clarifying connections with black box algebra (as defined in Sect. [2.1](#Sec5){ref-type="sec"}).

Homomorphic Encryption: Basic Definitions {#Sec2}
-----------------------------------------
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                \begin{document}$$\mathsf {X}$$\end{document}$ denote the sets of plaintexts and ciphertexts, respectively, and assume that we have some (say, binary) operators $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\boxdot _A$$\end{document}$ on *A* needed for processing data and corresponding operators $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathsf {X}$$\end{document}$. An encryption function *E* is *homomorphic* if$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$ E(a_1 \boxdot _A a_2) = E(a_1) \boxdot _\mathsf {X}E(a_2) $$\end{document}$$for all plaintexts $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$a_2$$\end{document}$ and all operators on *A*.

Suppose that Alice is the owner of data represented by plaintexts in *A* which she would like to process using operators $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\boxdot _A$$\end{document}$ but has insufficient computational resources, while Bob has computational facilities for processing ciphertexts using operators $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\boxdot _\mathsf {X}$$\end{document}$. Alice may wish to enter into a contract with Bob; in a realistic scenario, Alice is one of the many customers of the encrypted data processing service run by Bob, and all customers use the same ambient structure *A* upto isomorphism and formats of data and operators which are for that reason are likely to be known to Bob. What is not known to Bob is the specific password protected encryption used by Alice. This is what is known in cryptology as Kerckhoff's Principle: *obscurity is no security*, the security of encryption should not rely on details of the protocol being held secret; see \[[@CR11]\] for historic details.
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                \begin{document}$$ \mathsf {x} = E(a_1) \boxdot _\mathsf {X}E(a_2) $$\end{document}$$without having access to the content of plaintexts $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$a_2$$\end{document}$, then return the output $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathsf {x}$$\end{document}$ to Alice who decrypts it using the decryption function $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$ E^{-1}(\mathsf {x}) = a_1 \boxdot _A a_2 $$\end{document}$$In this set-up, we say that the homomorphic encryption scheme is *based* on the algebraic structure *A* or the homomorphism *E* is a *homomorphic encryption of* the algebraic structure *A*.

To simplify exposition, we assume that the encryption function *E* is deterministic, that is, *E* establishes a one-to-one correspondence between *A* and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathsf {X}$$\end{document}$. Of course, this is a strong assumption in the cryptographic context; it is largely unnecessary for our analysis, but, for the purposes of this paper, allows us to avoid technical details and makes it easier to explain links with the black box algebra.

Back to Algebra {#Sec3}
---------------

In algebraic terms, *A* and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\mathsf {X}$$\end{document}$ as introduced above are algebraic structures with operations on them which we refer to as *algebraic operations* and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$ E: A \longrightarrow \mathsf {X}$$\end{document}$ is a homomorphism. In this paper we assume that the algebraic structure *A* is finite as a set. This is not really essential for our analysis, many observations are relevant for the infinite case as well, but handling probability distributions (that is, random elements) on infinite sets is beyond the scope of the present paper.

We discuss a class of potential attacks on homomorphic encryption of *A*. Our discussion is based on a simple but fundamental fact of algebra that a map $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$ E:A \longrightarrow \mathsf {X}$$\end{document}$ of algebraic structures of the same type is a homomorphism if and only if its graph$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$ \varGamma (E) = \{(a,E(a)) \mid a\in A\} $$\end{document}$$is a substructure of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$A\times \mathsf {X}$$\end{document}$, that is, closed under all algebraic operations on $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\varGamma (E)$$\end{document}$ is isomorphic to *A* and we shall note the following observation:"**if an algebraic structure***A* **has a rich internal configuration (has many substructures with complex interactions between them), the graph**$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\varGamma (E)$$\end{document}$ **of a homomorphic encryption**$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$E: A \longrightarrow \mathsf {X}\,$$\end{document}$ **also has a rich (admittedly hidden) internal configuration, and this could make it vulnerable to an attack from Bob.**"We suggest that"**before attempting to develop a homomorphic encryption scheme based on a particular algebraic structure***A* **, the latter needs to be examined by black box theory methods -- as examples in this paper show, it could happen that***all* **homomorphic encryption schemes on***A* **are insecure.**"

Black Box Algebra {#Sec4}
=================

Axiomatic Description of Black Box Algebraic Structures {#Sec5}
-------------------------------------------------------

A *black box algebraic structure* $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathsf {X}$$\end{document}$ is a black box (device, algorithm, or oracle) which produces and operates with 0--1 strings of uniform length $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$l(\mathsf {X})$$\end{document}$ encrypting (not necessarily in a unique way) elements of some fixed algebraic structure *A*: if $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathsf {x}$$\end{document}$ is one of these strings then it corresponds to a unique (but unknown to us) element $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\pi $$\end{document}$ is the decrypting map, not necessarily known to us in advance. We call the strings produced or computed by $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathsf {X}$$\end{document}$ *cryptoelements*.

Our axioms for black boxes are the same as in \[[@CR6]--[@CR8]\], but stated in a more formal language.
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                \begin{document}$$\mathsf {X}$$\end{document}$ produces a 'random' cryptoelement $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$l(\mathsf {X})$$\end{document}$, which depends on $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\mathsf {X}$$\end{document}$, which encrypts an element $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\pi (x)$$\end{document}$ of some fixed explicitly given algebraic structure *A*; this is done in time polynomial in $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$l(\mathsf {X})$$\end{document}$. When this procedure is repeated, the elements $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\pi (\mathsf {x}_1), \pi (\mathsf {x}_2),\dots $$\end{document}$ are independent and uniformly distributed in *A*.

To avoid messy notation, we assume that operations on *A* are unary or binary; a general case can be treated in exactly the same way.
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                \begin{document}$$\mathsf {X}$$\end{document}$ performs algebraic operations on the encrypted strings which correspond to operations in *A* in a way which makes the map $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\pi $$\end{document}$ (unknown to us!) a homomorphism: for every binary (unary case is similar) operation $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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It should be noted that we do not assume the existence of an algorithm which allows us to decide whether a specific string can be potentially produced by $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathsf {X}$$\end{document}$. Also, we do not make any assumptions on probabilistic distribution of cryptoelements.
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We say in this situation that a black box $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Clearly, in black box problems, the decrypting map $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\pi $$\end{document}$ is not given in advance. However, it is useful to think about any algebraic structure (say, a finite field) implemented on a computer as a trivial black box, with $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\pi $$\end{document}$ being the identity map, and with random elements produced with the help of a random number generator. In this situation, obviously, the axioms BB1--BB3 hold.

In our algorithms, we have to build new black boxes from existing ones and work with several black box structures at once: this is why we have to keep track of the length $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$l(\mathsf {\mathsf {X}})$$\end{document}$ on which a specific black box $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\mathsf {X}$$\end{document}$ operates. For example, it turns out in \[[@CR8]\] that it is useful to consider an automorphism of *A* as a graph in $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Morphisms {#Sec6}
---------
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Construction and Interpretation {#Sec7}
-------------------------------
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If this is done in a consistent way and axioms BB1--BB3 hold in $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathsf {Y}$$\end{document}$ encrypts an algebraic structure *B* which can be obtained from the structure *A* by a similar construction, with algorithms replaced by description of their outputs by formulae of first order language in the signature of *A*. At this point we are entering the domain of model theory, and full discussion of this connection can be found in our forthcoming paper \[[@CR9]\]. Here we notice only that in model theory *B* is said to be *interpreted* in *A*, and if *A* is in its turn interpreted in *B* then *A* and *B* are called *bi-intrepretable*. A recent result on bi-interpretability between Chevalley groups and rings, relevant to our project is \[[@CR20]\].

A Few Historic Remarks {#Sec8}
----------------------

Black box algebraic structures had been introduced by Babai and Szeméredi \[[@CR4]\] in the special case of groups as an idealized setting for randomized algorithms for solving permutation and matrix group problems in computational group theory. Our Axioms BB1--BB3 are a slight modification -- and generalization to arbitrary algebraic structures -- of their original axioms.

So far, it appears that only finite groups, fields, rings, and, very recently, projective planes (in our paper \[[@CR8]\]) got a black box treatment. In the case of finite fields, the concept of a black box field can be traced back to Lenstra Jr \[[@CR16]\] and Boneh and Lipton \[[@CR5]\], and in the case of rings -- to Arvind \[[@CR3]\].
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Recognition of Black Box Fields {#Sec9}
-------------------------------
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                \begin{document}$$\mathsf {K}$$\end{document}$ is a *black box field of known characteristic p*. We refer the reader to \[[@CR5], [@CR17]\] for more details on black box fields of known characteristic and their applications to cryptography.

The following theorem is a reformulation of the fundamental results in \[[@CR17]\].

### Theorem 1 {#FPar1}
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Here and in the rest of the paper, "efficient" means "computable in time polynomial in the input length".

In our terminology (Sect. [2.6](#Sec10){ref-type="sec"}), Theorem [1](#FPar1){ref-type="sec"} provides a *structural proxy* for black box fields of known characteristic. Indeed, if $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Corollary 1 {#FPar2}
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Construction of a Structural Proxy {#Sec10}
----------------------------------
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*Construction of a structural proxy:* Suppose that we are given a black box structure $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Structural proxies and structure recovery play a crucial role for algorithms developed in Theorem [3](#FPar4){ref-type="sec"}. We summarize relevant results about constructing structural proxies of black box algebraic structures from our papers \[[@CR6], [@CR8]\].

### Theorem 2 {#FPar3}

We can construct structural proxies for the following black box structures.
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Black Boxes Associated with Homomorphic Encryption {#Sec11}
--------------------------------------------------

As explained in Subsection [1.1](#Sec2){ref-type="sec"}, we assume that the algebraic structure *A* of plaintexts is represented in some standard form known to Bob. In agreement with the standard language of algebra -- and with our terminology in \[[@CR8]\] -- we shall use the words *plain element* or just *element* in place of 'plaintext' and *cryptoelement* in place of 'ciphertext'.
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A Black Box Attack on Homomorphic Encryption {#Sec12}
============================================
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Bob's Attack {#Sec13}
------------
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                \begin{document}$$ E =\beta \circ \delta , $$\end{document}$ the map *E* is also known and allows Bob to return to Alice cryptoelements which encrypt plaintexts of Bob's choice.

We suggest that this approach to analysis of homomorphic encryption is useful because it opens up connections to black box algebra. Indeed the theory of black box structures is reasonably well developed for groups and fields, and its methods could provide insight into assessment of security of other algebraic structures if any are proposed for use in homomorphic encryption.

Application of Theorem [2](#FPar3){ref-type="sec"} to Homomorphic Encryption {#Sec14}
============================================================================

The procedures described in Theorem [3](#FPar4){ref-type="sec"} below are reformulations of the principal results of our Theorem [2](#FPar3){ref-type="sec"} in a homomorphic encryption setup. They demonstrate the depth of structural analysis involved and suggest that a similarly deep but revealing structural theory can be developed for other algebraic structures if they are sufficiently rich ('rich' here can mean, for example, 'bi-interpretable with a finite field'). Also, it is worth noting that the procedures do not use any assumptions about the encryption homomorphism *E*, the analysis is purely algebraic.

Theorem 3 {#FPar4}
---------
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Items (c) and (d) in Theorem [3](#FPar4){ref-type="sec"} look as serious vulnerabilities of homomorphic encryptions of the groups $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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We think that this is a manifestation of a more general issue: for small odd primes *p*, there are no secure homomorphic encryption schemes based on sufficiently rich (say, bi-interpretable with finite fields) algebraic structures functorially defined over finite fields of characteristic *p*.
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